There have been concerns among security professionals and privacy advocates about changes to the Australian 2016 Census. The biggest concern is how the ABS plans to combine your private data. The ABS will link your Census records across multiple products, services and share it with other government departments.
In the past, this has never been a problem because the ABS never used our individual name and address data. Consequently, people could answer uncomfortable questions honestly, with the knowledge that even if data were to leak, there would be no back to them.
The Census Data Statistical Linkage Key (SLK)
This year that has changed, the ABS revealed plans to assign Australians a unique identification number called a Statistical Linkage Key or SLK. Continue reading
An in-depth explanation regarding the security surrounding statistical linkage keys, why they’re important and how their security can be compromised…
The security of the Australian 2016 Census has sparked much debate and consternation among privacy advocates and security professionals alike. At the core of these concerns is a move by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (the ABS) to start linking census records to other data. The mechanism proposed for linking records and data is a ‘random looking’ Statistical Linkage Key. We have been told that the linkage key is secure and will be ‘hashed’ to make it irreversible – but what exactly does that mean, and how does it secure your data?
Introducing the Statistical Linkage Key
Statistical Linkage Keys or SLKs have been used frequently by people doing data research, it provides some very basic anonymity, and a sanity check on the data while retaining a way of identifying an individual throughout a study.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics publishes a standard called the SLK581 cluster. It defines a method for turning “Jane Smith 01/01/2007 Female” in to random looking serial number like “MIHAN010120072”. Continue reading
How are businesses and organisations handling your email? I know how they’re handling mine!
For about 10 years I’ve used “burnable email addresses”. These are email addresses that I can use and expire. They are unique to every relationship between me and another organisation, business or blog that I register with. This means I know who’s got my email and if they’ve leaked it. I know if they’ve shared if or if they’re spamming it.
I guess that makes me a living honeypot? But, unlike many automated honeypots that try to trap malicious users, the data from my email servers are based on real-world interactions between myself and others. Continue reading